On the eve of the third research assessment exercise, Richard Mullender argues that HEFCE's bid for more central control does little to allay the fears of those in institutions not selected for research funding.
The Higher Education Funding Council for England has told the Dearing committee that it wants more central control over higher education. With enhanced powers it claims it will be better able to shape the sector by encouraging differentiation between, and cooperation among, institutions.
HEFCE could be right. The idea of central coordination suggests an approach to decision-making in which the sector-wide "big picture" provides a touchstone against which the aims of particular institutions can be rationally assessed.
HEFCE has offered only an outline plan, but it seems reasonable to suppose that it seeks a future in which some institutions (perhaps on a multi-institutional basis) concentrate on teaching and others on research.
The idea that a limited number of institutions should specialise in research is gaining momentum. Discussion centres around the possibility of research being concentrated in a small number of ivy league institutions.
Such discussion has become more animated. This is both because the Secretary of State for Education and Employment, Gillian Shephard, has shown enthusiasm for the idea of research being restricted to a handful of institutions and because two groups of "old" universities (ie the Russell and 94 groups) are proclaiming the research-related merits of their members.
Much can be said in support of an ivy league. With only limited funds available for research, it can be argued that funding should be channelled to those institutions expected to yield the most significant output.
Discussion of this possibility leads to another prominent talking point in higher education: namely, the Research Assessment Exercise. The RAE links research-related funding to research output. It thus establishes an incentive structure which has, inter alia, fostered a market in talented, productive researchers. Some institutions have, it seems reasonable to suggest, operated more successfully in this market than others.
Support for this view can be found in the recently published results of the last RAE cycle (1992-96). They reveal that research activity is becoming increasingly concentrated in a small number of institutions.
Such concentration bears directly on a question which must be faced if an ivy league of research-focused universities is to be established: namely, "by what means should its membership be determined"? One possible answer to this question can be found in the RAE. A further RAE cycle could reasonably be expected to bring about even greater concentration of research output and thus work to identify a body of institutions that could function as centres of research-related excellence.
But will there be another RAE? In HEFCE's submissions to Dearing, this question was not directly addressed. HEFCE did, however, express the view that "the balance between reliance on the market . . . on the one hand and . . . planning and direction on the other may need to shift towards a more explicitly interventionist role at the centre." In support of this view, HEFCE argued that the "self-interest" which animates institutions and individuals in the market compares unfavourably with central control as a means by which to organise higher education. In many areas, the case for central control is strong. It could, for example, provide a means by which to ensure that duplication of teaching and administrative effort is avoided. Its desirability vis-a-vis the task of establishing an ivy league is, however, open to objection.
First, any extension in the scope of central control will, other things being equal, reduce the force of the incentives generated by the RAE. Such an extension can, hence, be expected to weaken the RAE's effectiveness as a means by which to identify those who have strong claims to ivy league status.
Second, decentralised decision-making of the sort which the RAE encourages can be regarded as preferable to central coordination of research activity. This is because institutions, departments, and individual academics typically possess, unlike central planners, a sizeable fund of information that is specific to the environments within which they operate. This information sensitises its possessors to the opportunities that usually exist in, for example, disciplinary contexts. It provides the basis for informed, nuanced decision-making (concerning, inter alia, the pursuit of ambiguous worthwhile research agendas).
Third, in circumstances where institutions and individuals are free to act on the basis of such information, they can be expected to take decisions that will, on the evidence of the RAE, conduce to the emergence of an ivy league. Support for this view is provided by perhaps the most striking phenomenon of the last RAE round: namely, the so-called "transfer market" in research-active academics. In the period from 1992 to 1996, it became ever more apparent that some institutions were demonstrating an ability to identify and recruit talented researchers. The ability, moreover, of some institutions to facilitate research activity gave them a competitive edge in this market.
While the RAE may provide a means by which to identify ivy league institutions, it is not my aim to suggest that it is an unalloyed good. It is open to criticism on, inter alia, the three following grounds.
First, those institutions that decide to compete for ivy league status can be expected to seek to maximise the research output of their staff. The upshot of such efforts is likely to be the generation (or intensification) of an unattractive low-trust environment in which research-related performance is officiously monitored.
Second, we can reasonably anticipate that a further RAE round will issue in low levels of loyalty on the individual level and low levels of collegiality on the institutional level. In the former case, individuals can be expected to relocate from comparatively weak to comparatively strong institutions in a bid to ensure that they at least have a research-oriented future. On the latter level, institutions can be expected to seek to lure talented personnel away from competitor institutions.
Third, while a market fostered by the RAE may generate an outcome which would provide a basis upon which to identify ivy league-level research, it should not be supposed that the results reached will be unproblematically fair. The market should not be conflated with a level playing field. Competition will be skewed by the occupation of positions of comparative advantage or disadvantage. We can, hence, expect to encounter results that provide poignant proof of the significance of each.
The future is threatening for those who are not situated in institutions that can reasonably be expected to secure ivy league status. They are confronted by the prospect that their careers as researchers may soon be brought to an end.
It is in these unprepossessing circumstances that the market exerts its appeal. The source of this appeal is easily explained. While a race to the ivy league structured around the RAE may be unequal, a place on the starting line is at least guaranteed. The plans of a more powerful HEFCE may, for many, be less accommodating.
Richard Mullender lectures in law at the University of Newcastle.